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Executive Summary
The need to make the best use of the 2014 March European Council and to provide a clear vision of what
a European Industrial Renaissance entails is more than pressing. Time is precious and the responsibility of
EU heads of state and government is tremendous. Claire Dhéret argues in this discussion paper that they
should seize the opportunity offered by the European Council to pave the way for an EU industrial policy
providing the industry with what it needs most: an unambiguous and well-defined strategic plan for the
decades to come.
This paper begins with the current prospects for European manufacturing. Facts and figures leave no room
for ambiguity: the sector has been facing serious difficulties for a long time, illustrated by the constant
reduction of the manufacturing share in almost all indicators. This steady decline is the result of two
simultaneous developments: ever-mounting external pressures (1), as well as a profound fragmentation in
the way industrial policies are pursued across Europe (2). The combination of these developments and the
EU's incapacity to respond to a changing environment with one clear and common vision has made its
industrial base uneven across the territory. In addition, growing divergences of industrial output across the
EU and uncoordinated industrial policies are likely to have negative spill-over effects on other aspects, such
as the functioning of the internal market and the resilience of the common currency.
Second, the author gives an overview of past and present EU actions to re-industrialise Europe. It is argued
that despite recognising the importance of manufacturing for the economy with an additional ambitious
rhetoric for re-industrialising Europe, the weakness of the current policy framework, both regarding the lack
of clarity of EU strategic orientations and their questionable impact on national policies, seems unsuited to
meet ongoing challenges.
Introduction
In response to the decision to cancel the February 2014 European Council a feeling of disenchantment has
taken possession over the European business community in Brussels, going even beyond the strict
boundaries of the usual group of industrial lobbyists. The widely and long awaited decision of having an EU
Summit dedicated to industrial competitiveness represented a strong signal to place industrial policy at
centre stage of the European agenda. Since then, the European Commission published the Communication
entitled "For a European Industrial Renaissance" in January 2014 "urging Member States to recognise the
central importance of industry for creating jobs and growth, and of mainstreaming industry-related
competitiveness concerns across all policy areas"2. But the issue of industrial competitiveness has been
postponed to the already loaded agenda of the 2014 March European Council. Whilst this shows that
industrial competitiveness is still receiving political attention, having it as part of a wider agenda raises the
risk of getting swamped by other urgent matters. Extraordinary events like the ones related to the Ukrainian
crisis have shown how rapidly the political agenda can be disrupted.
Notwithstanding the less favourable conditions to make tangible decisions on the future of EU industrial
policy, the need to make the best use of the European Council is more than pressing. Time is precious,
particularly with the upcoming European elections, and the struggle of many European industries to remain
competitive. There is an urgent need to address, on the one hand, the disillusionment EU citizens feel about
the inadequacy of policies to boost economic recovery and to make the European Union (EU) a robust
global player, and on the other hand, to respond to large expectations of the business community. These
expectations are all the more significant as the European Commission has sent, over the last years, strong
signals indicating its firm intention to adopt an integrated industrial strategy and to become a more active
supporter for European industries. 
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Based on this assessment, and in the view to provide EU industries with a clear strategic plan, three possible
scenarios with several policy implications are outlined: Towards the Europeanisation of the Value Chain (1);
The EU as Facilitator of a Level-Playing Field (2); and The Predominance of the Free Market Approach and
National Forces (3). They represent very different ways in which an EU industrial policy could evolve in the
coming years. Fostering a frank debate around these three scenarios is urgently needed as it would provide
the right framework to answer the key questions lying at the core of a new industrial policy for Europe.
Finally, the author suggests three concrete steps, which would lay the foundations for an EU industrial
strategic plan. These steps include:
1. Coalition-building  of EU countries to take the lead in the design of a EU industrial compact;
2. The establishment of a reflection group with high-level experts and a clear mandate to address the 
key questions of the future orientation of EU industrial policy, whilst also reflecting upon the policy
implications of the three scenarios mentioned above; and
3. Concrete proposals – made by the coalition of EU countries – to address the main obstacles 
threatening EU industrial competitiveness: i.e. financial fragmentation (1), energy prices and the high
price differential with Europe's competitors (2), and the absence of a level-playing field with other 
regions of the world (3), which should be addressed by the revision of the EU's state aid framework
and the opening of foreign markets to EU industries through for instance, a stronger focus of trade 
negotiations on access to foreign public procurement markets.
Supporting the re-industrialisation rhetoric with a real action plan is crucial as focusing on either ambitious
communication or technical and marginal issues will fall short of addressing the magnitude of current
challenges and will rather perpetuate a long tradition where EU industrial policy is caught between a rock
and a hard place.
The simple act of putting industrial competitiveness on the agenda and reiterating well-known statements
will not be sufficient. The responsibility of EU heads of state and government is tremendous and they should
seize the opportunity offered by the 2014 March European Council to pave the way for an EU industrial
policy providing the industry with what it needs most: an unambiguous and well-defined strategic plan for
the decades to come. To this end, EU heads of state and government will have to courageously face the key
questions, which can no longer be ignored. 
These questions include:
 What are the main factors challenging the competitiveness of European industries and what would be
the added-value of EU actions in addressing them? 
 What should European and national authorities do and, equally importantly, not do as part of a new
industrial policy?
 What is the role that manufacturing should play in industrial policy3 and Europe's recovery?
 Should Europe aim at a precise target for manufacturing production – irrespective of its nature – or 
should it focus on certain types of industrial activities? 
 How to make the best use of EU industrial policy to benefit Europe's economy and support national 
re-industrialisation strategies? 
In this discussion paper representing the intermediary step of the EPC Task Force4 on EU industrial policy,
Claire Dhéret describes current prospects for European manufacturing industries and gives an overview of
EU actions, past and present, to re-industrialise Europe. Based on this assessment, three possible scenarios
with several policy implications are outlined. They represent very different ways in which an EU industrial
policy could evolve in the coming years and present strategic options that should be taken seriously by
policy-makers. Fostering a frank debate around these three scenarios is urgently needed as it would provide
the right framework to answer the key questions mentioned above. Finally, a series of concrete proposals
have been suggested, which would, if endorsed by EU heads of state and government, lay the foundations
for an EU industrial strategic plan and respond to the most pressing expectations of both EU citizens and
the business community.
Part 1: Gloomy prospects for European manufacturing industries
The decline of manufacturing in Europe is nothing new and a long list of studies already exists on the topic,
leaving no room for ambiguity: the sector has been facing serious difficulties for a long time (a situation,
which has been aggravated by the economic crisis in some countries), illustrated by the constant reduction
of the manufacturing share in almost all indicators. The share of manufacturing in GDP has fallen from
15.8% before the crisis to 15.1% in 2013 and 3.5 million jobs have been lost since 2008.5 In addition, one
can observe a significant decline in the role of Europe in global manufacturing output as indicated by the
EU's share of global manufacturing value added, which dropped from 30% in 2003 to 23% in 2010.6 While
such trends reflect, to some extent, a structural shift to the service sector and the changing nature of
manufacturing7, which mirrors the move towards a more knowledge-intensive and green economy, they
also reveal a profound weakness in EU manufacturing.
The steady decline over the last decades is the result of two simultaneous developments: ever-mounting
external pressure and the growing role of emerging economies at a global scale (1) as well as a profound
fragmentation – marked by national choices and interests whose sustainability are questionable in certain
countries – in the way industrial policies are pursued across Europe (2). The combination of those
developments and the EU's incapacity to respond to a changing environment with one clear and common
vision has significantly weakened its industrial base, making it uneven across the territory and ill-equipped
for global challenges.
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Ever-mounting external pressure
The ever-mounting external pressure has led to the emergence of a new global distribution of manufacturing
production and, as a result, to the decreasing importance of manufacturing in Europe's economy, which has
intensified over recent times and has been driven by several factors. 
First, productivity in Europe is running out of steam and progression is much slower than in other parts of
the world (despite a relative strong productivity growth in manufacturing compared to the one in services).
Not only do the usual competitors, which are also undertaking a 're-industrialisation strategy', such as the
United States (U.S.), out-perform Europe8, but the productivity in emerging industrial giants is catching up
at high speed. Innovation and investment in research and development (R&D) undeniably plays a significant
role in explaining this growing productivity gap. However, more importantly, it is the capacity to translate
research into the commercialisation of products, which is key. Looking at innovation output instead of input
shows that the EU is underperforming with too much focus on basic research.9 Conversely, countries like
China invest much more in applied research and experimental development10, enabling them to turn
research into advanced products.
Second, production costs play a role in determining the location of manufacturing production in different
countries as they represent a key competitiveness factor and affect the final price of a product. Among them,
energy costs feature as one of the top concerns of European industries due to the increase in energy price
differential between Europe and its major competitors. For instance, estimations of the International Energy
Agency show that EU industrial electricity prices are twice higher than in the U.S. and Russia and 20%
higher than in China.11 In light of recent choices made by our competitors (especially the 'shale gas
revolution' occurring in the U.S.) and in the absence of any ambitious EU actions in this field, there is,
unfortunately, no sign of a possible decrease in energy price differential in the near future. 
Labour costs are also playing a role in total production costs. Their relation to productivity12, in addition to
trade liberalisation driven by the reduction in transport costs and technological progress (particularly in
information and communication technologies (ICT)), have contributed to favour the migration of
manufacturing employment outside Europe. Indeed, labour costs differ enormously between EU countries
and emerging economies, making it impossible for Europe to compete on this aspect.13 In this context,
dealing with the cost of offshoring and coordinating activities between and within companies has become
more profitable for European industries than concentrating all activities in one location. Hence,
globalisation has profoundly changed how manufactured goods are produced and delivered to final
consumers. Production processes have internationalised, leading to an increased fragmentation of the value
chain and the disappearance of certain types of manufacturing employment in Europe.14
Third, recent macro-economic forecasts have shown that a large part of economic growth15 will be located
outside Europe in the years to come. Where demand for manufactured goods is stagnating in Europe due
to oversaturated markets, the rapid expansion of the middle class in other parts of the world is creating a
large cohort of new consumers. This will shape the global distribution of manufacturing production even
further, raising both opportunities and challenges for European manufacturing. European industries are
therefore likely to continue to migrate their activities outside Europe in order to have direct access to those
new consumers and to enable businesses to grow.
The European Union…let's call it European fragmentation!
Despite the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the EU has been characterized by
significant divergences in manufacturing performance and there is no doubt that the EMU is far from being
homogenous in this regard. Major drivers of competitiveness, be it productivity level, capacity to export, or
the structure and diversity of the manufacturing base, have evolved in different ways across the territory. For
instance, comparing levels of labour productivity across Europe confirms the presence of huge differences
between EU countries. While countries like Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg had a productivity level of
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above 50 euro per hour worked in 2012, the level of a large number of Eastern and Central European
countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) as
well as some Southern countries (Cyprus, Greece, Malta, and Portugal) was below 25 euro.16
As for the internationalisation of European companies, the situation also varies from country to country. For
instance, German companies have been very successful in integrating emerging markets into their
production chains and it represents a key source of their competitive advantage and their export
performance. Drivers of this success are both explained by structural and institutional factors. From a
structural viewpoint, the changes Germany has gone through over the last decades17 have played an
important role. This takes into account the average size of German companies18 compared to other EU
countries; the relatively easy access to credit; as well as the slow wage growth – allowed by a strong social
dialogue. From an institutional perspective, the good performance of Chambers of Commerce and
Industries to represent German interests outside Europe has often been taken as an example.
It is thus a set of factors, which explains the long and persistent fragmentation of the European industrial
landscape and which has contributed to the co-existence of different industrial models in Europe.
Nowadays, the EU is composed, on the one hand, of strong industrial bases in countries like Germany
which hold a robust position on global markets and whose model is clearly export-oriented19 and, on the
other hand, Member States with relatively high commercial deficits (France, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy)
and in some cases, little diversity in their industrial sector. Recent developments, especially the economic
crisis and its consequences, have not only highlighted the co-existence of these models, they have also
intensified the fragmentation of manufacturing output across Europe. The manufacturing industry has
indeed been more resistant to the crisis and to previous global changes in some countries but it is now
facing a long and rapid declining trend in others. The orientation taken by each model has contributed to
some extent to these growing divergences: While Europe's internal demand has been undermined by the
recent recession, it is the export-oriented model which has managed to offset sluggish domestic demand by
exports and to appear – at least for the near future – as a winner. 
In addition to the importance of structural and institutional factors mentioned above, the co-existence of
such different models in Europe is due to the fact that industrial policies are shaped by national interests.
Industrial and innovation policies are driven by national concepts and strategic choices do mostly reflect
the role played by specific sectors in each country and the nature of the relations between relevant
stakeholders. Such differences are difficult to overcome as they both reflect deep-rooted traditions and
because industrial policy has always been seen as a national preserve. A diversified industrial policy across
the EU could undeniably benefit Europe's economy, yet it is the predominance of national interests and the
absence of coordination between different models, which bear specific risks. 
The risky consequences of uncoordinated industrial policies
Pursuing economic integration whilst having very different industrial models has been often considered
risky in several respects.
From an internal market point of view, both the divergence of manufacturing output as well as the
predominance of national interests in the way industrial policy is carried out, represent clear obstacles to
the well-functioning of the internal market. Given that innovation and national investments are primarily
driven by national traditions, picking out common priorities is difficult. Furthermore, this diversity of non-
coordinated investments does not favour cross-cutting trans-border projects or the emergence of pan-
European networks, therefore hampering potential growth. In such a context, completing the single market
and streamlining investments are condemned to remain marginal.
From a monetary perspective, the strong cleavage between the demand-driven and the exports-oriented
models represents weak foundations for the currency union. Having such different models has been
vehemently denounced by the opponents of the single currency as an element making the establishment of
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a viable monetary system impossible. This element has been, however, neglected for a long time at the
policy level and it has been placed into sharp spotlight only recently, as signalled by the ongoing debate of
whether Germany's current account surplus20 is harming the rest of the eurozone economy. Its significant
high surplus of exports over imports has been indeed pointed out as a potential risk by the European
Commission, which is now entitled to detect possible macro-economic imbalances21 in each Member State. 
Part 2: A new motto 'Re-industrialise Europe' – too little, too late?
Against this dismal background, it is questionable whether Europe is doing enough to create the right
framework conditions for boosting the competitiveness of its manufacturing industries. Despite a
recognition of the importance of manufacturing for the economy, the weakness of the current policy
framework, both regarding the lack of clarity of EU strategic orientations and their questionable impact on
national policies, seems unsuited to meet ongoing challenges.
A large recognition in the role of manufacturing industry 
'Industrial policy matters!' is the new slogan citizens hear all over Europe. Alongside very fierce campaigns
to keep the industrial base on the national territory, governmental reports and communications highlighting
the key role that manufacturing may play in reviving national economies have proliferated. Even in
countries such as the UK where the largely dominating neoliberal economic doctrine has allowed market
forces to shape the economy for the last 30 decades and to shift it away from its traditional strengths in
manufacturing towards financial services, the rhetoric has now changed.22 De-industrialisation is no longer
perceived as a natural process of economic development and the focus on the services sector has somewhat
faded away due to several factors. The high volatility of financial markets and the recent bursting of the
financial sector have obviously contributed to revive the interest in manufacturing. In addition, the
comparative resilience of some EU countries with a strong industrial base to the economic recession,
together with the positive role that the state played in robust and/or emerging economies, debunked the
laissez-faire mantra and encouraged EU Member States to recognise both the need for industrial policy and
the importance of having a proactive state supporting strategic industries. 
The change in rhetoric is also explained by some strong evidence showing that manufacturing is an essential
pillar of the economy as "additional final demand in manufacturing generates around half as much
additional final demand elsewhere in the economy".23 Indeed, manufacturing represents the major source
of investment in R&D (65.3% between 2008 and 2010)24, a key source of exports (67% of Europe's
exports)25 and a main driver for employment in other sectors, including services (each additional job in
manufacturing creates 0.5-2 jobs in other sectors).26
In light of this, while manufacturing and services have been considered by some as two incompatible
choices of economic strategies in the past, there is now no doubt that the two of them are complementing
each other, or even depending on each other. Services have indeed entered the world of manufacturing 
in all sequential stages of a product, be it in the development, production or marketing phase, and the
service content in manufacturing final output has significantly increased over the last decades.27
Disentangling the production of manufactured goods from the pre- and after-sales services has therefore
become increasingly difficult. 
Despite the recognition in the importance of a large and strong industrial base, some basic questions
pertaining to the nature of Europe's re-industrialisation strategy are left in the air. Answering these 
basic questions are, however, a pre-condition for the design of a robust and coherent EU industrial 
strategy capable of meeting present and future challenges and of providing European industries with a 
long-term vision.
6
The EU strategy – Go back to basics!
Looking at what constitutes industrial policy both at EU and national level suggests that it is difficult to get
a clear idea of whether a strategic direction has been taken. First of all and from a theoretical viewpoint, it
is hard to grasp what is understood by 'industrial policy' as the term is not always used with the same
meaning. Where some strategic documents emphasise the need to boost manufacturing production, others
have a larger scope and also include the services embedded in it. Hence, defining first what industrial
policy is and is not, should provide the starting point of any solid plan.
Secondly, from a more pragmatic viewpoint there is no indication of what the key objectives are that should
be pursued by an EU industrial strategy. While EU Industry Commissioner Antonio Tajani announced the
Commission's aspiration to raise the contribution of industry to GDP to as much as 20% by 202028, how to
reach such a target is left open. In other words, the European Commission does not provide any indication
of what kind of production activities this 20% should be composed of and leaves the following questions
open: What is hidden behind such a figure? Is the intention to shift European manufacturing only towards
high added-value activities or to re-locate most of the production chain in Europe in order to protect jobs,
including those that are low-skilled and low-waged? What is Europe's approach vis-à-vis the increased
fragmentation of production processes, which is undeniably leading to job migration but might also
augment European industries' competitiveness by allowing them to reduce production costs and to gain
new market shares?
An answer to these questions could be found in recent strategic documents of the Commission, emphasising
on the knowledge economy and suggesting that Europe should focus on high value-added goods and
services.29 However, the approach currently taken by a large number of Member States is more ambiguous.
National public discourses promoting national pride under the banner of 'Made in [national country]' are
becoming increasingly popular. Furthermore, state actions to bail out ailing industries in order to protect
employment – irrespective of its type – are making headlines frequently30, although it might be questioned
whether they occur more often than in the past.
Adding to the ambiguity, it is questionable that actions aiming to achieve the 20% target of manufacturing
contribution to GDP will support other EU objectives, in particular relating to climate change and energy.
Recent EU communications in those fields have been strongly denounced by the industry as creating
additional costs and threatening their competitiveness. More importantly, EU objectives on climate and
energy31, on the one hand, and industrial competitiveness and manufacturing production, on the other, are
often perceived as two antagonistic choices, which are difficult to reconcile. Hence, the industry community
has even accused the EU targets on climate and energy to accelerate Europe's de-industrialisation. This signals
a great deal of confusion and a perceived lack of coherence between different EU policies, which in turn,
might reduce the attractiveness of Europe for private and foreign investment. It is, therefore, now time for the
EU to clarify its position on this matter32, to decide on the future of energy-intensive industries in Europe, and
to identify how far Europe can play a role in climate change mitigation without a global framework.
The EU industrial policy: a myth?
As indicated above, it is undeniable that the EU institutions is trying to become more active with regards to
industrial policy and to mainstream industrial competitiveness into other policy fields through various ways.
For instance, recent developments in the Union's new economic governance have shown that the European
Commission is becoming more vocal – in particular through the country-specific recommendations
published in the framework of the European Semester – on issues deemed as key drivers of competitiveness
such as taxation on labour and wage setting system, the internationalisation and commercialisation of
research, the diversification of the industry, energy policy, and the export capacity of firms.33
In light of this, EU competences on industrial policy are, however, still limited, and the Union does not have
a clear mandate to act in this field. The main reference to industrial policy in the Treaty, Art. 17334,
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8underlines the EU's role in creating the conditions necessary for the industry's competitiveness but restricts
it to measures in support of national actions. As a result, measures aiming to drive industrial change are
either relying on instruments from other policies, mainly internal market provisions, competition policy and
trade policy, or on soft tools allowing consultation and coordination between Member States. This
architecture is not only the result of a market-driven approach which has dominated EU policies over the
last decades, but also of the wide resistance of Member States to endow the EU with more forceful
instruments. Whether this division of competences is optimal is a debate on its own, and goes beyond the
scope of this paper. However, recent exchanges35 on state aid surveillance illustrate how aspects of such a
framework can create tensions between the European and national level, and indicate how European and
national powers can constrain each other.
In addition to constraining aspects of the framework, one may also wonder whether there is sufficient
coordination between investment priorities across Europe. In its 2012 communication36 the Commission
decided to complement its horizontal approach with a more vertical one, giving emphasis on specific
technologies. Hence, it announced intentions to focus investment and innovation on six priority action
lines: advanced manufacturing technologies, key enabling technologies, bio-based products, sustainable
industrial and construction policy and raw materials, clean vehicles, and smart grids. The success of turning
such action lines into investment with a critical mass will obviously depend on whether similar priorities
will be captured by other governance levels, such as the national and regional ones. 
Looking at the industrial plans of three Member States with a firm commitment to re-industrialisation, i.e.
France, Italy, and the UK, one can observe that the response to this question is far from obvious. Where all
three countries have set out a roadmap of re-industrialisation and have agreed on horizontal measures
aiming to set the right framework conditions for increased competitiveness, only France and the UK have
identified very clear investment priorities in specific technologies, as shown by the comparative overview
provided in Figure 1. This comparative overview shows that, although some priorities are similar both
between the EU and national levels and among Member States, it is not always the case. Therefore, such
similarities seem to be more coincidental rather than a deliberate intention to promote policy coordination.
Furthermore, France and Italy37 have recently been the main initiators in a group of EU countries38 calling
for strong alliances in industrial policy, as well as an increased EU role in industrial policy. It is, however,
hard to see the concrete implications of this call in terms of policy and investment coordination. There is
neither an indication that national investments are coordinated with each other or aligned on the six EU
priority action lines. 
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Part 3: Hard but necessary choices for the future of industrial policy in Europe 
The two first parts of this paper have shown that despite an urgent need to address current challenges, EU
industrial policy is trying to be everything for everyone. Bringing more consistency and coherence in the
way industrial policy is pursued will certainly require hard but necessary choices (highlighted below in the
scenarios), providing the industry with more clarity and better predictability and increasing therefore the
attractiveness of Europe for investment. 
Europe has recently heard a host of ambitious declarations and snappy slogans, including  'manufacturing
revolution' and 'industrial renaissance', which now need to be turned into tangible deeds. To this end,
Europe needs a more in-depth reflection on the adequacy of current framework aspects supported by a
sound and evidence-based understanding of the comparative advantage each framework could generate. In
other words, Europe should initiate a thoughtful process of evaluating how an optimal framework could
ensure the elimination of tensions between European and national competences, offer smooth coordination
between EU and national policies and maximise the benefits of EU interventions. 
In order to kick-start the reflection process, the following presents three possible framework scenarios –
called Towards the Europeanisation of the Value Chain (1); The EU as Facilitator of a Level-Playing Field (2);
and The Predominance of the Free Market Approach and National Forces (3) – with very different strategic
options for the future of industrial policy in Europe. Where assessing the competitive advantage of each of
those scenarios goes beyond the scope of this paper and is also a clear matter of political choices, this paper
focuses mainly on drawing the scenarios' contours and setting the scene for further discussions.39
Scenario 1:  Towards the Europeanisation of the Value Chain
Moving towards the Europeanisation of the Value Chain implies a deeper integration of EU manufacturing with
a high degree of intra-community specialisations based on national comparative advantages, more cooperative
industrial relations among Member States, and the integration of many policies such as the ones related to
research, labour market, innovation, and energy. European investment is streamlined in a coordinated way to
ensure higher return and trans-European network projects as well as clusters form a key pillar of scenario 1.
Europe is put at the centre of the production process and of the value chain without, however, neglecting the
outside world. Such a scenario implies significant transfers of competences to the EU level and key changes in
the way Member States approach industrial policy. National discourse promoting 'Made in…[national country]'
would be replaced by a 'Made in Europe' giving a solid recognition to European champions. A robust 
EU governance model is a pre-condition to follow this path and should not necessarily involve all Member
States as such a qualitative leap may only become possible with industrial models sharing a certain degree 
of similarity. Furthermore, scenario 1 requires a political commitment which goes beyond what we have seen
so far.
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The scenarios described above represent three different strategic options for the future of industrial policy.
Although scenarios often bear the risk of over-simplification, they also offer the advantage of putting the
cards on the table and clarifying what is at stake. Fostering a debate around them and their policy
implications, ranging from institutional aspects, division of competences, policy reforms to budget
considerations and EU fiscal capacity, will put EU Member States in front of essential questions and outline
clear choices, forcing them to confront the future strategic direction of EU industrial policy. 
Developing a shared vision around one of these scenarios will obviously not occur overnight. It takes a long
process requiring the involvement of all relevant stakeholders, including the industry, and the full
commitment of our policy-makers. The forthcoming European Council meeting should mark the starting
point of such a reflection process. 
In order to achieve such an objective, three concrete and ambitious steps listed below should be seriously
implemented and undertaken by the EU heads of state and government at the 2014 March European Council:
Scenario 3: The Predominance of the Free Market Approach and National Forces 
Going back to the mere predominance of national forces in the design and implementation of industrial policy
requires not only abandoning moves towards a deeper European integration but also dismantling some
achievements of the past. The third scenario does not mean the disintegration of the single market but places it
at the centre of its strategy, leaving aside convergence mechanisms. The free market approach is at the core of
scenario 3. The predominance of national forces and interests lead to the promotion of a culture of competition
among EU Member States, regions and industries. Each Member State has its own way to deal with the
globalisation process and its possible consequences on domestic industries and specialisation. The co-existence
of very different industrial models in Europe is reinforced and industries are likely to be more concentrated in
certain parts of the EU territory. In addition, the pursuit of the free market approach is likely to lead to the
disappearance of weak industries and to reinforce the position of the most competitive ones. Under such
circumstances, divergences between EU Member States are likely to grow, putting tremendous pressure on the
common currency. 
Scenario 2:  The EU as Facilitator of a Level-Playing Field 
Concentrating on the facilitating role the EU could play in establishing a level-playing field for industry in the
EU and beyond its borders is the scenario closest to reality as it implies striking a delicate balance between
European and national competencies. Several steps, laying the foundations for such a scenario – like the single
market - have already been launched for decades. However, the EU's role in creating a level-playing field is far
from being optimal. Important steps – some of them still under construction – will have to be pursued so as to
turn the current architecture into a coherent bloc in which EU and national policies complement each other in
a mutually reinforcing way. Completing and deepening the Single Market in order to boost intra-EU trade forms
the most important pillar of such a scenario and some coordination and convergence mechanisms in areas like
innovation, connectivity and cross-border infrastructure are fully activated in order to grasp the full benefits of
the single market. In addition, instruments to strengthen the external dimension of EU industrial policy and
engage in economic diplomacy will be further developed. This scenario combines an internal pragmatic
approach, where Member States remain the main agents in the design of the strategic direction of future
industrial developments, with a robust external strategy.
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First, there is no doubt that clear-cut choices in EU industrial policy will not be achieved without a high-
level political commitment. A coalition of EU countries needs to take the lead in order to form governmental
alliances and to work on the design of an EU industrial compact, which would complement the Compact
for Growth and Jobs. The already existing group of EU countries called 'Friends of Industry' could serve as
a forerunner for such a group but it will need to be endowed with clear objectives and a real action plan. 
Second, this coalition of EU countries should establish a reflection group of high-level experts with a clear
mandate to carry out analysis on cross-cutting and cross-sectoral issues, which are at the core of any
industrial strategic plan. The starting point of this analysis should address the questions raised in this paper:
 What are the main factors challenging the competitiveness of European industries and what would be
the added-value of EU actions in addressing them?
 What is the role that manufacturing should play in industrial policy and Europe's recovery?
 Should Europe aim at a precise target for manufacturing production – irrespective of its nature – or 
should it focus on certain types of industrial activities? 
 Is the 20% manufacturing target a useful goal and how can it be combined with objectives in energy
and climate change?
 How to make the best use of EU industrial policy to benefit Europe's economy and support national
re-industrialisation strategies?
In addition, the group of high-level experts should reflect upon the policy implications of the three scenarios
mentioned above in the view to identify the opportunities and challenges each of them would raise. The
analysis should follow a rigorous timetable and the results should be delivered to the heads of state and
governments within a reasonable time span. Such an exercise and the clear mandate given by a coalition
of Member States would provide a right balance between experts' analysis and political choices. Indeed,
the objective would be to feed the analysis findings into the choices made by the coalition.
Third, the coalition of EU countries would need to agree on some concrete proposals addressing the main
obstacles, which are currently threatening industrial competitiveness in Europe. The priority should be given
to three main issues perceived as top concerns by European industries: the financial fragmentation and the
difficulty to access finance in some parts of Europe; energy prices and the high price differential with
Europe's competitors; and the absence of a level-playing field with other regions of the world. This should
be addressed by the revision of the EU's state aid frameworkand the opening of foreign markets to EU
industries through for instance, a stronger focus of trade negotiations on EU industries' access to foreign
public procurement markets.
These three concrete steps are undeniably ambitious. But they could ensure that the March European
Council will produce substantial results moving away from analysis and towards a real action plan offering
simultaneously concrete long-term solutions to the more pressing issues and providing European industries
with a clear vision on the future of the EU industrial policy. This opportunity should not be missed, as time
is precious. Supporting the re-industrialisation rhetoric with a real action plan is crucial because it focuses
on either ambitious communication or technical and marginal issues, falling short of addressing the
magnitude of current challenges. This will rather perpetuate a long tradition where EU industrial policy is
caught between a rock and a hard place.
Claire Dhéret is a Policy Analyst at the European Policy Centre.
EPC Discussion Papers aim to promote debate about current issues.
The views expressed are the sole responsibility of the author.
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